When you visit a HTTPS site, the server must present a certificate, signed by a trusted third-party (a Certificate Authority, aka CA), vouching for the identity of the bearer. The certificate contains an expiration date, and is considered valid until that date arrives. But what if the CA later realizes that it issued the certificate in error? Or what if the server’s private key (corresponding to the public key in the certificate) is accidentally revealed?
Enter certificate revocation. Revocation allows the trusted third-party to indicate to the client that a particular certificate should no longer be considered valid, even if it’s unexpired.
There are several techniques to implement revocation checking, and each has privacy, reliability, and performance considerations. Back in 2011, I wrote a long post about how Internet Explorer handles certificate revocation checks.
Back in 2018, the Microsoft Edge team decided to match Chrome’s behavior by not performing online OCSP or CRL checks for most certificates by default.
Wait, What? Why?
The basic arguments are that HTTPS certificate revocation checks:
- Impair performance (tens of milliseconds to tens of seconds in latency)
- Impair privacy (CAs could log what you’re checking and know where you went)
- Are too unreliable to hard-fail (too many false positives on downtime or network glitches)
- Are useless against most threats when soft-fail (because an active MITM can block the check)
For more context about why Chrome stopped using online certificate revocation checks many years ago, see these posts from the Chromium team explaining their thinking:
Note: Revocation checks still happen
Chromium still performs online OCSP/CRL checks for Extended Validation certificates only, in soft-fail mode. If the check fails (e.g. offline OCSP responder) the certificate is just treated as a regular TLS certificate without the EV treatment. Users are very unlikely to ever notice because the EV treatment, now buried deep in the security UX, is virtually invisible. Notably, however, there is a performance penalty– if your Enterprise blackholes or slowly blocks access to a major CA’s OCSP responder, TLS connections from Chromium will be very slow.
Even without online revocation checks, Chromium performs offline checks in two ways.
- It calls the Windows Certificate API (CAPI) with an “offline only” flag, such that revocation checks consult previously-cached CRLs (e.g. if Windows had previously retrieved a CRL), and certificate distrust entries deployed by Microsoft
- It plugs into CAPI an implementation of CRLSets, a Google/Microsoft deployed list of popular certificates that should be deemed revoked.
On Windows, Chromium uses the CAPI stack to perform revocation checks. I would expect this check to behave identically to the Internet Explorer check (which also relies on the Windows CAPI stack). Specifically, I don’t see any attempt to set dwUrlRetrievalTimeout away from the default. How CAPI2 certificate revocation works. Sometimes it’s useful to enable CAPI2 diagnostics.
CRLSets are updated via the Component Updater; if the PC isn’t ever on the Internet (e.g. an air-gapped network), the CRLSet will only be updated when a new version of the browser is deployed. (Of course, in an environment without access to the internet at large, revocation checking is even less useful.)
After Chromium moves to use its own built-in verifier, it will perform certificate revocation checks using its own revocation checker. Today, that checker supports only HTTP-sourced CRLs (the CAPI checker also supports HTTPS, LDAP, and FILE).
Group Policy Options
Chromium (and thus Edge and Chrome) support two Group Policies that control the behavior of revocation checking.
The EnableOnlineRevocationChecks policy enables soft-fail revocation checking for certificates. If the certificate does not contain revocation information, the certificate is deemed valid. If the revocation check does not complete (e.g. inaccessible CA), the certificate is deemed valid. If the certificate revocation check successfully returns that the certificate was revoked, the certificate is deemed invalid.
The RequireOnlineRevocationChecksForLocalAnchors policy allows hard-fail revocation checking for certificates that chain to a private anchor. A “private anchor” is not a “public Certificate Authority”, but instead e.g. the Enterprise root your company deployed to its PCs for either its internal sites or its Monster-in-the-Middle MITM network traffic inspection proxy). If the certificate does not contain revocation information, the certificate is deemed invalid. If the revocation check does not complete (e.g. inaccessible CA), the certificate is deemed invalid. If the certificate revocation check successfully returns that the certificate was revoked, the certificate is deemed invalid.
Note: This section may be outdated!
Here’s an old survey of cross-browser revocation behavior.
By default, Firefox still queries OCSP servers for certificates that have a validity lifetime over 10 days. If you wish, you can require hard-fail OCSP checking by navigating to about:config and toggling security.OCSP.require to true. See this wiki for more details.
For the now-defunct Internet Explorer, you can set a Feature Control registry DWORD to convert the usual soft-fail into a slightly-less-soft fail:
Edge Legacy did not have any option for non-silent failure for revocation checks.